نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشجو دکتری، گروه علوم سیاسی، واحد شهرضا، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، شهرضا، ایران
2 استادیار، گروه علوم سیاسی، واحد بوشهر، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، بوشهر، ایران
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله English
نویسندگان English
Anti-corruption reforms in Iran, despite increasing necessity and internal and international pressures, have failed to achieve effective and sustainable results over the past decades due to institutional, cultural, and structural barriers. This study, employing an institutional analysis approach and qualitative methods, examines the reasons behind the failure of these reforms. Data were collected through the analysis of 24 official documents and 18 semi-structured interviews with experts, government officials, and policymakers in the governance sector. The findings indicate that three main mechanisms play a decisive role in shaping institutional resistance: first, historical dependence and institutional lock-in, which prevent changes along established paths; second, unhealthy interactions between formal institutions and informal power networks, which perpetuate opaque relationships and reproduce corruption-prone patterns; and third, institutional fragmentation and weak coordination among responsible agencies, which undermine the implementation capacity of reforms. The results suggest that without gradual institutional restructuring, increased transparency, and strengthened independence of supervisory bodies, anti-corruption policies in Iran will continue to fail. Finally, the study offers practical recommendations for reducing institutional resistance, enhancing organizational accountability, and institutionalizing sustainable reforms.
کلیدواژهها English
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