Administrative Health Research (AHR)

Abstract Decent governance is a multifaceted concept, the goal of decent governance is to increase the efficiency of a political system for the administration of society. In traditional politics, the main issue of power is government, but in governance, the main issue is better to run society and institutions with the support of government power. Although researchers in various sciences have looked at the issue of good governance from their perspective and make recommendations for implementation, given the limitations of governments, it is necessary to identify priorities in good governance; evaluating good governance indicators in developing countries requires a multifaceted approach, so the present study was conducted with the aim of evaluating and ranking good governance indicators from the perspective of experts using the method of Phase hierarchical analysis. According to studies, the key components of decent governance can be considered political stability, quality of supervision, control of corruption, rule of law, effectiveness of government and participation. On the other hand, in order to evaluate Governance Indicators, three methods of calculating the Millennium Challenge, The Global Governance Index and the combined index were also evaluated. Corruption control was considered the most important criterion for evaluating among the criteria for evaluating the indicators of decent governance; the next rankings belong to the criteria of the rule of Law, popular participation, quality of supervision, political stability and effectiveness of the state, respectively. In view of the results obtained in response to the question of which method is best suited to evaluate decent governance, taking into account all the evaluation criteria among the methods examined, it can be said that the Global Governance Index is ranked first. The next rankings are the combined Index and the Millennium Challenge Account, respectively

Abstract Globally, free access to information is a cornerstone of ensuring transparency in the activities of public institutions. However, this principle sometimes conflicts with other rights and values, such as the rights related to trade secrets. The lack of a precise definition for trade secrets held by public institutions, the uncertainty surrounding the boundaries and mechanisms for ensuring their confidentiality, and doubts regarding the application of access-to-information obligations to such data create ambiguous boundaries, leading to significant challenges. On one hand, these challenges may manifest as breaches of the legitimate trade confidentiality of public entities, and on the other, as arbitrary non-transparency in their commercial activities. This raises the question: how can the right to free access to information for transparency purposes be reconciled with the right to protect the trade secrets of economic entities? To address this question, this research by identifying the legal and practical challenges and conflicts involved, Using a descriptive-analytical approach and drawing on national and international laws, practices, and written and digital library resources, seeks to provide solutions to balance these two conflicting rights. The findings indicate that certain laws related to public access to information include exceptions regarding the disclosure of specific types of data, including trade secrets. In Iranian law, a guideline has also been published regarding the distinction between public information and trade secrets. However, this article posits that since ambiguities still remain in this regard and the mentioned regulations do not provide sufficient clarity, in cases of conflict and lack of explicit provisions, transparency and public access to information should be prioritized as a fundamental right.

Abstract The utilization of artificial intelligence as a tool for combating corruption and promoting administrative integrity necessitates the elucidation of the legal foundations of intelligent supervision and inspection, as well as addressing certain legal questions regarding its application in oversight processes. This article aims to define the concept of intelligent supervision, examine the aforementioned legal questions, and introduce new considerations in the discourse on oversight and artificial intelligence. The research seeks to answer the fundamental question of how the legal framework for intelligent supervision and the use of AI capabilities can contribute to combating administrative corruption and ensuring administrative integrity. This study is based on determining the role of technology and technological products, including software and robots, within the concept of supervision. Establishing this role will shape the framework of intelligent supervision. Given the determination of technology's role as a tool or a self-executing entity, this article will delineate the legal framework for its utilization. Furthermore, the study will address key legal questions arising from challenges in public law, such as the principle of legality, the principle of accountability, data privacy, and confidentiality.

Abstract Managing conflicts of interest and identifying their situations depend on the legal and regulatory framework, as well as each country’s definition of the issue. Proper management and resolution of these situations provide the basis for preventing corruption and public distrust. For example, each country's energy sector and its natural monopoly create the context for the emergence of the aforementioned challenges. Solving this challenge becomes more complex when new actors enter the regulatory arena. It is necessary to consider all dimensions of an issue and the stakeholders and actors in the energy sector based on specific logic, such as regulatory governance. Based on this logic, setting regulations and creating transparent procedures in the interactions of actors, as well as identifying conflicts of interest and providing solutions if situations arise, are among the functions of this type of governance. Evaluating the impact of regulations is one of the principal measures of regulatory governance. Accordingly, policymakers and legislators assess the effectiveness of laws by continuously reviewing and updating laws related to conflicts of interest management. If they are ineffective, they amend them or enact more effective laws.

Abstract The issue of combating corruption has been a long-standing concern for Chinese statesmen, ultimately leading to the establishment of an institution known as the National Supervisory Commission. Understanding the true nature of this institution within the framework of liberal concepts, which dominate the constitutional law literature, is not possible and presents an incomplete picture. In this research, by adopting the analytical constitutional framework of Jiang Shigong, a Chinese political and legal theorist, an attempt has been made to clarify the nature of this institution within China's constitutional order. According to this new framework, to comprehend China's constitutional order, one must look beyond the written legal texts. In this regard, Jiang Shigong considers the role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as central to the constitutional legal order and regards the Party's leadership as the supreme principle of China's constitutional law. From his perspective, the Party is not merely a political reality but a fundamental norm that underpins the entire legal system. He views the Party as the custodian of political affairs and the state as the custodian of administrative affairs. Based on Jiang Shigong's analysis, as well as an examination of the process of establishing this institution and its relationship with the National People's Congress, it can be argued that this newly established institution has a political-administrative nature. Due to this dual nature, it is considered the highest supervisory and anti-corruption body in China. Furthermore, this indicates that, in the minds of the founders of this institution—namely, the Party—corruption and the fight against it are not purely administrative matters; if they were, this responsibility would have been delegated to the government as the custodian of administrative affairs.

Abstract This study aimed to enhance the integrity of the administrative system by identifying, analyzing, and interpreting the obstacles to combating corruption in a national company affiliated with Iran’s oil industry. Adopting an interpretive philosophy, the research employed a grounded theory strategy and a qualitative methodology based on unstructured interviews. The participants comprised secretaries of the company’s Administrative Integrity Committee. Interview transcripts were meticulously reviewed and reread to extract key overt and latent concepts. Qualitative data were analyzed using a three-stage coding process (open, axial, and selective coding). The analysis yielded 89 concepts, categorized into 39 open codes, 42 axial codes, and 8 selective codes. These codes revealed the following barriers to combating corruption: Legal, Financial, Structural, Managerial, Political, Cultural, Process-related and Environmental. From a research perspective, the findings contribute to scholarly work in public administration, economics, political science, and sociology. Practically, they offer actionable insights for policymakers, public managers, and senior oil industry executives to design and implement strategies for mitigating corruption barriers.